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CASENOTES
Absolute Presidential Immunity From Civil Damage Liability: Nixon v.
Fitzgerald' — The Constitution of the United States contains no express provi-
sion dealing with the immunity 2 of the President of the United States from civil
damage liability. 3 Prior to 1982, the United States Supreme Court apparently
had considered the general issue of presidential immunity on only two occa-
sions,* and had never dealt with the specific question of presidential immunity
from civil damage liability. Moreover, in the nearly two hundred years
preceding 1971, only one lawsuit was brought in which a party sought civil
damages from a United States president for his actions in office, and that case
was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. 5 Then, in 1971, in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 5 the United States Supreme Court held that
violations of individual constitutional rights by federal agents would give rise to
an implied cause of action for damages.' On remand in Bivens, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit refused to grant the agents ab-
solute immunity, 8 thus opening the door for consideration of presidential im-
munity. Subsequently, in 1980 a panel of the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia held in Halperin v. Kissinger, 9 that no presidential
1 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982).
"Immunity", in this context, has been defined by Prosser as follows: "An immunity
avoids liability in tort under all circumstances, within the limit of the immunity itself; it is
conferred, not because of the particular facts, but because of the status or position of the favored
defendant; and it does not deny the tort, but the resulting liability." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF TORTS 970 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. Dean Prosser has
noted that the difference between an immunity and a privilege is "largely one of degree," since a
privilege avoids liability "only under particular circumstances" where it is reasonable not to im-
pose liability, thus defeating "the existence of the tort itself." Id.
"Absolute immunity," as used herein, is that immunity "designed to protect certain
discretionary functions from even the burden of litigation." Freund, The Supreme Court, 1973
Term — Foreword: On Presidential Privilege; 88 HARV. L. REV. 13, 20 n.41 (1974). For a good
general discussion of the term immunity, see Note, Halperin v. Kissinger: The D.C. Circuit Rejects
Presidential Immunity From Damage Actions, 26 LOY. L. REV. 144, 144 n.1 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Note, Halperin v. Kissinger].
Article II, § 4 of the United States Constitution does provide that the President may
be removed from office by impeachment for certain crimes and misdemeanors. U.S. CONST. art.
II, 4.
4 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974) (no absolute, unqualified
Presidential immunity from judicial process under all circumstances); Mississippi v. Johnson, 71
U.S. 475, 501 (1866) (no Supreme Court jurisdiction of bill to enjoin President in performance of
official duties). See also Note, Halperin v. Kissinger, supra note 2, at 144 n. 1.
3 See: Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2706 n.1 (1982) (Burger, C.J., concurring)
(citing Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660 (C.0 .D. Va. 181:1) (No. 8,411)). In Livingston, a
lower federal court dismissed a suit against Thomas Jefferson for being improperly brought in
Virginia, thus precluding the necessity of reaching any immunity is,sue. Livingston v. Jefferson,
15 F. Cas. at 663. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
6 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See infra note 207.
7 Id. at 390-97.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents Of The Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 456
F.2d 1339, 1341 (2d Cir. 1972).
606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aff'd by an equally divided vote, 452 U.S. 713 (1981). In
Halperin, the Supreme Court was equally divided on the lower court's ruling. 452 U.S. at 713.
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immunity exists cloaking the Chief Executive from civil damage liability.'° In
1982, however, the United States Supreme Court in Nixon v. Fitzgerald held that
the President of the United States is entitled to absolute immunity from civil
damage liability predicated on his official acts, at least for implied causes of ac-
tion."
In Nixon, A. Ernest Fitzgerald, a management analyst with the Depart-
ment of the Air Force, had testified before a congressional subcommittee in the
closing months of the Johnson Administration about cost overruns and unex-
pected technical difficulties in the development of the C-5A air transport. 12 His
testimony embarrassed Department of Defense officials," and Fitzgerald was
notified shortly thereafter that his "tenure" as a civil servant was being re-
voked." Nearly a year after his testimony, Fitzgerald's job was abolished by
presidential order and his employment terminated." The Subcommittee on
Economy in Government held hearings immediately thereafter to determine if
The holding below therefore was affirmed, but apparently no precedent was established. This is
evidenced by the Nixon Court's holding of absolute presidential immunity from civil damage
liability, coupled with the Court's failure even to mention Halperin in its holding. See infra note 11
and accompanying text.
Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
" Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2701 & n.27 (1982). The Nixon Court noted
that its holding was limited to absolute immunity from civil damage liability in the absence of ex-
plicit affirmative action by Congress. Id. at 2701 n.27. Fitzgerald's complaint had stated implied
causes of action under both the first amendment and two federal statutes. See infra note 33 and ac-
companying text. The Nixon Court assumed for the purpose of its opinion that such constitutional
and statutory causes of action could be implied by Fitzgerald. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. at
2701 n.27. The Court added, however, that it did not necessarily follow from that assumption
that implied constitutional and statutory causes of action would run against the President. Id.
The reason for this conclusion, the Court stated, was that these implied causes of action had to be
considered in light of the immunity doctrine. Id. When looked at in light of the immunity doctrine, the
Court found, these implied causes of action did not represent an express undertaking by Con-
gress to deprive the President of absolute immunity. Id. By considering together the implied
causes of action arising under the Constitution and federal, statutes, the Nixon Court apparently
concluded that one standard for finding absolute immunity for the President from civil damage
liability applies to both types of implied causes of action.
12
 See Economics of Military Procurement: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economy in Govern-
ment of the joint Economic Comm., 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 199-202 (1968) (testimony of A. Ernest Fitz-
gerald).
13
 Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2694 n.1 (1982). Less than two months after
this appearance, staff had prepared a memo for outgoing Secretary of the Air Force Harold
Brown, detailing three ways to get rid of Fitzgerald, among them a "reduction in force," the
method eventually used. Id.
14
 See The Dismissal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald by the Department ofDeinse: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969) (State-
ment of William Proxmire, Chairman, SEGJEC). Fitzgerald's tenure had been given to him
shortly before the congressional hearing at which he testified about the C-5A. Id. Fitzgerald was
later told that status had been granted by "computer error." Id.
15 See id. On November 14, 1969, a general reorganization of the Department of the Air
Force was announced with a reduction in defense and government manpower generally. This
reorganization was to be effective January 5, 1970. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2694
n.1 (1982).
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this action was taken in retaliation for his testimony." The press, which had
given wide play to the earlier announcement of the job elimination action, also
covered these hearings prominently." At a December 8, 1969, press con-
ference, President Nixon was asked about Fitzgerald's impending separation
from government service and promised to look into the matter." When Nixon
proposed that Fitzgerald be reassigned, however, resistance was encountered
within his administration." On January 5, 1970, Fitzgerald left government
employment without an offer of another position."
Fitzgerald complained first to the Civil Service Commission. 21 When the
Commission attempted to hold a closed hearing, however, Fitzgerald obtained
an injunction to have a public hearing. 22 The public hearings commenced on
January 26, 1973, 23 and on September 18, 1973, the Commission issued a deci-
sion determining the abolition of Fitzgerald's job to have been improper and
recommending that he be returned to his old job, or a compa.table one, and
receive back pay." Upon receiving what he deemed an inadequate job offer, 23
Fitzgerald filed an enforcement action in the United States District Court for
16 Id. These hearings, on November 17 and 18, 1969, were reported in The Dismissal of
A. Ernest Fitzgerald by the Department of Defense: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economy in Government
of the joint Economic Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1-216 (1969). In addition, 60 members of Con-
gress signed a letter to the President protesting the "firing of this dedicated public servant" as a
"punitive action." Id. at 115-16.
" Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2694 (1982). News media coverage led some
staff members to recommend that the President direct the Secretary of Defense to find Fitzgerald
another position of equal pay and stature. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari To The District of
Columbia Circuit, Joint Appendix at 270a, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982).
18 Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2694 (1982), Subsequently, Nixon asked Chief
of Staff H.R. Haldeman to arrange for Fitzgerald's assignment to another job in the Administra-
tion. Id. It also appears Nixon suggested to Budget Director Mayo that Fitzgerald be offered a
job in the Bureau of the Budget. Id.
18 Id. White House Aide Alexander Butterfield wrote an internal memorandum to H.
R. Haldeman on January 20, 1970, questioning Fitzgerald's loyalty and recommending that
Fitzgerald not be reassigned. Id.
28 Id. at 2694 & n.l.
21 Id. at 2695. In a letter dated January 20, 1970, respondent's attorneys submitted an
appeal to the Civil Service Commission under Part 351, Subpart 1 of the Civil Service Regula-
tions. Petition For a Writ of Certiorari To The United States Court of Appeals For the District of
Columbia Circuit, Joint Appendix at 61a, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982). Because
there was a prima facie showing that the reduction in work force may have been personal, a hear-
ing was scheduled. Id. at 61a.
22 Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2695 (1982). The Commission convened a
closed hearing on May 4, 1971. Id. Preferring to present his grievances in public, Fitzgerald
brought suit and won an injunction allowing him to do so. Id. (citing Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467
F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
23 Id. at 2695. There was a great deal of publicity accorded the hearing, particularly
over the testimony of Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. Id. Seamans denied Fitzgerald had
lost his job in a retaliatory move, but did concede that he had received "some advice" from the
White House and therefore invoked executive privilege. Id.
24 Id. at 2695-96. The Commission, however, specifically found that Fitzgerald had not
been fired in retaliation for his congressional testimony. Id.
22
 See id. at 2696 n.17.
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the District of Columbia, which culminated in a settlement agreement. 26 Still
dissatisfied, he filed suit for damages in the same court, raising essentially those
claims he had presented in the Commission and naming as defendants eight
Defense Department officials, White House aide Alexander Butterfield, and
other unnamed White House aides." The court dismissed the action under the
District of Columbia's three year statute of limitations." The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed as to all but one defend-
ant — White House aide Butterfield — and remanded the proceedings to the
federal district court. 29 On remand, following extensive discovery, Fitzgerald
filed a second amended complaint in the district court on July 5, 1978. 3° In this
complaint, filed slightly over eight years after his termination and complaint to
the Commission, he added President Nixon and White House aide Bryce
Harlow as defendants." In March of 1980, the federal district court denied
defendants' motion for summary judgment." In denying the motion, the court
stated that Fitzgerald had both statutory and constitutional causes of action. 33
The district court further ruled that former President Nixon was not entitled to
absolute immunity." Nixon then took a collateral appeal of the immunity deci-
sion to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia." The
court of appeals, without comment, granted Fitzgerald's motion to dismiss the
appeal." Nixon then brought a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court." The Supreme Court granted certiorari on June 22, 1981."
In deciding Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Coureheld that the President
of the United States is entitled to absolute immunity from civil damage liability
26 Id. Under the terms of this agreement, the Air Force agreed to reassign Fitzgerald to
his former position. Id.
27 Id.
" Id.
29 Id.
'° Id. at 2697. By this date, an internal memorandum authorized by Butterfield had
been published which recommended that Fitzgerald be "allowed to bleed" before being reas-
signed. Petition For a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, Joint Appendix at 85a, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982).
" In this amended complaint, Fitzgerald alleged that Nixon was "totally aware or
and "approved" Fitzgerald's dismissal. Id. at 2697 n.19.
32 Id. at 2697.
" Id. The district court ruled that the complaint stated not only a first amendment
claim, but also an implied cause of action under 5 U.S.C. 5 7211 (1976) which provides that an
employee's right to furnish information to Congress cannot be abridged, and 18 U.S.C. 5 1505
(1964), which makes it a felony to obstruct congressional testimony. Id. at 2697 n.20. The district
court also held Fitzgerald stated a common law tort claim under District of Columbia law, but
Fitzgerald abandoned this cause of action. Id. at 2697 n.20.
34 Id. at 2697.
" Id.
36 Id. The Supreme Court noted that in dismissing summarily the court of appeals ap-
parently had relied on its recent decision in Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir.
1979), aff'd by an equally divided vote., 452 U.S. 713 (1981).
" See 452 U.S. 959 (1981).
38 Id.
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predicated upon implied causes of action for violations of individual rights
resulting from official acts." The Nixon Court reasoned that the immunity
granted was "functionally mandated" by the President's unique constitutional
status and the separation of powers, and was supported by history and public
policy."
This casenote submits that Nixon v. Fitzgerald is in harmony with the
Court's prior decisions regarding immunity for public officials, despite
language apparently to the contrary. Although the Court spoke of the Presi-
dent's unique status, his singular importance and prominence and the separa-
tion of powers — thereby implying that Nixon was distinct from all other im-
munity decisions — this casenote will demonstrate that the Court's method of
analysis and balancing of factors was actually consistent with those prior im-
munity decisions and that absolute presidential immunity was simply the
highest step in the progression of varying immunities granted different govern-
ment officials. To set the stage for the Court's decision in Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
this casenote will begin by examining the history of presidential immunity from
civil damage liability, focusing on the Constitutional Convention debates, the
historical absence of civil suits against the President and the development of
immunity for other public officials. Then, the Court's reasoning in Nixon v.
Fitzgerald will be sketched, including briefly the reasoning of the concurring and
dissenting justices. Next, the conclusion that Nixon was consistent with the
Court's other immunity decisions and a natural continuation of those decisions
will be explained and supported. Further, this casenote will show that the deci-
sion was in some respects unique, thus making the absolute immunity granted
the President the strongest possible in our constitutional system of government.
Finally, the casenote will suggest that the Court's decision in Nixon was a nar-
row one, and that government officials seeking absolute immunity in future
cases will have to satisfy the stringent standards used by the Nixon Court in
finding absolute immunity for the President.
I. THE HISTORY OF PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY
In the absence of an express constitutional provision dealing with
presidential immunity from civil damage liability," the Nixon Court looked to
the historical roots of presidential immunity for guidance." Presidential im-
munity had been debated at the Constitutional Convention." Also, there was a
notable historic absence of civil suits against the President.** Moreover, the
Court in the past had itself developed guidelines for creating varying im-
" Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2701 & n.27 (1982). See supra note 11.
4° Id. at 2701.
4 ' See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
" Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2701, 2702 n.31 (1982).
'3 Id.
" Id. at 2703 n.33.
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munities for lower level government officials.'" An examination of these three
areas, therefore, is important to an understanding of the historical status of
presidential immunity at the time Nixon was decided.
A. The Constitutional Convention Debates
In the period immediately following the Revolutionary War, with the
authority of the king and his colonial governors destroyed, governmental
authority was vested to a great extent in the legislative branch." A combina-
tion of administrative ineffectiveness and legislative excess, however, helped
generate pressure at the Constitutional Convention for a strong executive in
the new order being created. 47 Nonetheless, memories of the colonial ex-
perience lingered. While the system agreed upon granted the President
substantial powers, it provided methods for restraining those powers as well. 48
Alexander Hamilton wrote that three procedural protections were envisioned
to achieve this balance: 49 political checks in the form of legislative votes against
presidential actions; accountability to the voting public at election time; and
impeachment by the Senate for high crimes and misderneanors. 5°
Convention delegates also considered — but never adopted — the idea of
providing expressly for the absolute immunity of the President from civil
damage liability. 5 ' Indeed, two sharply distinct views on presidential immunity
emerged from the Convention debates. On the one hand, two delegates to the
Convention, Senator Ellsworth and Vice President John Adams, declared that
the President could not be subject personally to any judicial process whatever,
since a single justice could then bring the entire government to a halt. 52 In ac-
cord with this view, a respected contemporaneous commentator, Justice Story,
argued that there were implied, incidental powers that belonged only to the ex-
ecutive branch." Story contended that among these incidental powers, by
necessity, was the power to carry out executive duties unimpeded." He
therefore concluded that the President could not be interfered with through
legal means while discharging the duties of his office, and was absolutely im-
mune — at a minimum — from civil process." Story added that the President
" Id. at 2699.
45 See C. THACH, THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY 1775 - 1789, 25-75 (1922 ed.).
" See id. at 52, 74, 169.
" See id. at 169-73.
.° See A. HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST no. 77, at 481-82 (1923 ed.).
5° Id. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, S 3; art. II, 5 4.
51 See infra notes 52, 57, 59-60 and accompanying text.
52 See W. MACLAY, THE JOURNAL OF WILLIAM MACLAY, 163 (1927 ed.) [hereinafter
cited as MACLAY].
53 See 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 5
814, at 579 (1833 ed.) [hereinafter cited as STORY].
See id.
35 See id.
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was accountable only to his country and himself in the exercise of his political
power." Adams and Ellsworth were in accord with Story on this point, stating
that impeachment of the President was the only recourse and that no other
process could be brought against him." In addition, Thomas Jefferson argued
that the President was not intended to be subjected to judicial process. 58 On the
other hand, some participants in the Convention debates either stated or im-
plied that the President would be as amenable to civil suit as any other citizen.
Mr. Wilson at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention stated that the President
was accountable at law both by suit as a private citizen and by impeachment as
a public officer." In addition, Senator Pinckney, who had been a delegate to
the Convention, argued on the floor of the Senate in 1800 that, in contrast to
the express immunity granted the legislature in the Constitution, no immunity
was intended for the President." Thus, perhaps the most that can be said of the
Constitutional Convention debates was that they did not definitively settle the
issue of presidential immunity from civil damage liability but rather provided
arguments that both sides could and did use in Nixon.
B. The Historical Absence of Civil Suits Against the President
In its consideration of the historical background of presidential immunity,
the Nixon Court found little precedential guidance due to the almost total
absence of civil suits against the President prior to 1971. In fact in the nearly
two hundred years from 1789 to 1971, only one case appears to have arisen in
which a party sought civil damages from a President for his actions in office, 5 '
and it was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction." In this century, prior to the
56 See id.
" See MACLAY, Supra note 52, at 163.
88 Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2700 n.31 (1982), (citing 10 THE WORKS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, 404 (P. Ford ed. 1905)). When Chief Justice Marshall held that the Presi-
dent could be issued a subpoena duces tecum in United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va.
1807) (14,692d), Jefferson protested strongly and stated in a letter to the prosecutor of that trial:
The leading principle of our Constitution is the independence of the Legislature,
executive and judiciary of each other, and none are more jealous of this than the
judiciary. But would the executive be independent of the judiciary, if he were sub-
ject to the commands of the latter and to imprisonment for disobedience if the several
courts could bandy him from pillar to post, keep him constantly trudging from north
to south and east to west, and withdraw him entirely from his constitutional duties?
The intention of the Constitution, that each branch should be independent of the
others, is further manifested by the means it has furnished to each, to protect itself
from enterprises of force attempted on them by the others, and to none has it given
more effectual or diversified means than to the executive.
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. at 2700 n.31.
59 Id. at 2704 (White, J., dissenting).
6° Id. at 2704 (White, J., dissenting).
81 See Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660 (C.C.D. Va. 1811) (No. 8,411) which
sought damages for an alleged trespass committed by a marshal] at President Jefferson's order.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
62 Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660, 663 (C.C.D. Va. 1811) (No. 8,411).
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holding in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents 63
 that federal officials are
amenable to civil suit," most such civil actions were brought against the
United States or other officials within the administration, not against the Presi-
dent himself." Immediately following the Supreme Court's decision in Bivens,
a wave of civil damage actions were filed against President Nixon." These ac-
tions were all dismissed on the grounds of absolute immunity, 67 until the deci-
sion in Halperin denied such immunity to the President." In conclusion, case
law on presidential immunity from civil damage liability was virtually non-
existent. In deciding Nixon, therefore, the Court looked for guidance to its past
treatment of analogous controversies and settled on the analysis applied in the
determination of the immunity accorded other government officials.
C. The Development of Immunity for Public Officials
The final factor providing guidance to the Nixon Court on the historical
background of presidential immunity was the development at common law of
immunity for members of the three branches of government. The Court has
consistently recognized that both state and federal government officials are en-
titled to some form of immunity from suits for civil damages." This immunity
has been granted in two degrees — qualified and absolute — for different of-
ficials:7° Qualified immunity applies generally to both state and federal govern-
63 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
" Id. at 390-97.
" See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 583 (1952) (suit
against Secretary of Commerce challenging constitutionality of Executive Order issued by Presi-
dent); Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U:S. 602, 626 (1935) (suit against United
States challenging power of President to remove commissioner of Federal Trade Commission);
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) (suit against United States to determine if Presi-
dent alone can remove judge).
66 See, e.g., Reese v. Nixon, 347 F. Supp. 314, 315 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (suit against Nixon
for deprivation of constitutional rights by surveillance, false arrest and search and seizure); Atlee
v. Nixon, 336 F. Supp. 790, 791 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (taxpayer suit against Nixon challenging con-
stitutionality of expenditures for Vietnam War); Meyers v. Nixon, 339 F. Supp. 1388, 1389
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (class suit against Nixon to enjoin expenditures for Vietnam War).
See supra cases cited at note 66. See also Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2702
n.31 (1982).
• 68
 Halpering v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aff'd by an equally di-
vided vote, 452 U.S. 713 (1981). (President has only qualified immunity in civil damage action).
See supra note 9.
• 69 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506-07 (1978) (Secretary of Agriculture has
only qualified immunity when sued for constitutional violations); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232, 247 (1974) (state governor has qualified immunity for official acts); Bradley v. Fisher, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1871). (State judge has absolute immunity from civil suit for official
acts).
7 ' See Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896) (Postmaster General absolutely im-
mune from common law suits for official acts); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967)
(state judge absolutely immune from 1983 suit). But see Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508
(1978) (Secretary of Agriculture has only qualified immunity in suit for constitutional violations);
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974) (state governor sued for deprivation of in-
dividuals' constitutional rights has only qualified immunity).
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ment officials who are performing their official duties, even when they are sued
for violations of constitutional rights. 71 This immunity protects the official
when, in the view of the court, the official had reasonable grounds at the time
and in the circumstances for a good faith belief that he was acting legally and
within the scope of his duties." Absolute immunity, on the other hand, is
granted to certain state and federal government officials who performed
especially sensitive functions." It provides such officials a full exemption from
liability for actions taken in the broad exercise of their official duties, regardless
of bad faith or malicious intent."
In determining the degree of the immunity to grant a particular official,
the Court has looked to the nature of the duties performed, the type of action
brought and the public interest behind the immunity. For example, in 1871,
the Court held that judges are absolutely immune from civil actions for their
judicial acts, even when those acts are done maliciously and in excess of their
jurisdiction." Similarly, in 1896, the Court held that the Postmaster General
was absolutely immune from damages in a common law action based on his of-
ficial acts. 76 In very broad language, the Court concluded that the interests of
the people demanded this immunity." This same absolute immunity was later
extended to state legislators and judges even where the actions were for con-
stitutional violations." In 1974, however, the Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes,"
determined that State executive officials had only qualified good faith immuni-
ty where constitutional violations were alleged." As later construed, Scheuer set
" See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 508. See also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 10 .2 S. Ct.
2727, 2736 (1982) (presidential aides have qualified immunity for official acts); Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974) (state governor has qualified immunity when sued for con-
stitutional violations).
72 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 507; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. at 247-48.
73 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 508-17 (exception to general rule of qualified im-
munity where official performs especially sensitive duties); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
335, 347-48 (1871) (judges need absolute immunity due to emotional impact of their decisions).
7* See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 347.
" Id. at 347, 357.
76 Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896).
77 Id. The Court went on to state:
In exercising the functions of his office, the head of an Executive Department, keep-
ing within the limits of his authority, should not be under an apprehension that the
motives that control his official conduct may, at any time, become the subject of in-
quiry in a civil suit for damages. It would seriously cripple the proper and effective
administration of public affairs as entrusted to the executive branch of the govern-
ment, if he were subjected to any such restraint.
Id.
79 See, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372-79 (1951) (passage of 8 U.S.C. S
43 (1946) in the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 did not abrogate the privilege accorded to state
legislators at common law); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967) (judges still have ab-
solute immunity after passage of 42 U.S.C. 5 1983).
79 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
10 Id. at 247, 248. .
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up a two-tiered system of immunity defenses: 8 ' the first tier included most
government officials and provided qualified, good faith immunity; the second
tier included only those government officials with particularly sensitive duties
who needed, and retained, a continued absolute immunity."
In 1978, in Butz v. Economou, 83 the Court considered for the first time84 the
kind of immunity possessed by federal executive officials who are sued for con-
stitutional violations." Butz adopted the Scheuer division of immunities; most
federal officials, the Court held, possess a qualified, good faith immunity, but
some officials, notably judges and prosecutors, remain absolutely immune. 86
Butz, however, left open the question whether federal officials other than judges
and prosecutors could show that public policy required that they be granted ab-
solute immunity." While Halperin, an appeals court decision, answered that
question negatively as regards the President, the Supreme Court did not take a
definitive position on the issue until its decision in Nixon v. Fitzgerald."
With the Constitutional Convention debates not clearly settling the issue
of whether the framers of the constitution intended absolute immunity for the
President, and with the notable absence of prior civil suits against the Presi-
dent, the Court was left with but one method of analysis for determining the
type of immunity it would grant the President in Nixon. That method was the
application of the Court's prior immunity decisions to the facts presented in
Nixon for a determination of whether the President should be protected by
qualified or absolute immunity from civil damage suits.
81 Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2700 (1982). The Scheuer Court had held that
state executive officials had only qualified immunity in 1983 suits alleging violations of constitu-
tional rights. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974). Later decisions held, however, that
certain officials with especially sensitive duties still needed absolute immunity. See Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978) (state judges have absolute immunity for all judicial acts);
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976) (state prosecutors are absolutely immune for all
official acts). The Butz Court adopted the Scheuer rationale and held that qualified immunity ap-
plied to federal executive officials sued for constitutional violations. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.
478, 508-17 (1978). The Butz Court also recognized, however, that certain federal officials, due
to the sensitive functions that they perform, require absolute immunity. Id. at 508. The Nixon
Court is apparently the first court to describe the two different kinds of immunity as a "two-
tiered division." Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2700 (1982). The description is an ac-
curate one, however; the first tier includes most government officials and grants them qualified
immunity, while the second tier grants absolute immunity to certain officials performing
especially sensitive functions. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
" See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 508-17 (1978).
83 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
84 See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2700 & n.25 (1982) (distinguishing the suit
against the Postmaster General in Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896) from Economou on the
fact that the earlier case was predicated on common law and not the Constitution).
86 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 485-517 (1978).
86 Id. at 508.
8' See id. at 506.
86
 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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II. THE COURT'S REASONING IN NIXON V. FITZGERALD
A. The Majority's Analysis
In Nixon, after considering and rejecting two jurisdictional challenges, 89
the Supreme Court concluded that in Butz v. Economou it had left unresolved
which federal officials other than judges and prosecutors could demonstrate
that the nature of their duties mandated absolute immunity. 90 The Court
stated that its approach to the issue, by necessity," would be a combination of
historical and public policy analysis of United States constitutional heritage
and 'structure." The Court noted that it limited its holding to civil damage
• °9 ' Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2697 (1982). First, Fitzgerald argued that the
federal district court's order denying Nixon's motions to dismiss was not an appealable "case"
properly "in" the court of appeals within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. 5 1254 (1970). Id. at 2698.
The language of 5 1254 invests the Supreme Court with the authority to review cases "in" the
court of appeals. Id. at 2697 n.22. Nixon sought review of an interlocutory order denying his
claim to absolute immunity and the court of appeals dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See id. at
2698 & n.23. Considering this attack, the Nixon Court noted there was no serious doubt of their
ability to review a court of appeals decision to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 2698 n.3. The
Court stated that, under the "collateral order" doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47 (1949), a small class of interlocutory orders can be immediately ap-
pealed to the court of appeals. Id. at 2698. The Court held that Cohen defined this class as em-
bracing orders that "conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue
completely separate from the merits of the action, and are effectively unreviewable on appeal
from a final judgment." Id. (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)).
The Court noted that Cohen also established that a collateral appeal of an interlocutory order must
"present a serious and unsettled question." Id. (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337
U.S. 541, 547 (1949)). The Court noted that it had twice before held that orders denying claims
of absolute immunity are appealable under the Cohen criteria. Id. The Nixon Court determined
that the instant case raised an important and unsettled question, since there was alleged a
threatened breach of essential Presidential prerogatives under the separation of powers doctrine.
Id. The Court therefore held that the case was indeed within its certiorari jurisdiction based on
the "collateral order" doctrine of Cohen. Id.
Second, the plaintiffs in Halperin, as parties in interest in Nixon, challenged Fitzgerald's
contention that an agreement between the parties to liquidate damages had rendered the con-
troversy moot. Id. at 2699 n.24. Morton, Ina, David, Mark, and Gary Halperin made a Motion
to Intervene and For Other Relief, arguing that the liquidation agreement was contrary to their
interest in the pending case. See id. Under this agreement, Nixon paid Fitzgerald $142,000. Id. at
2699. In consideration, Fitzgerald agreed to accept liquidated damages of $28,000 if the Court
ruled that Nixon was not entitled to absolute immunity. Id. If the decision upheld Nixon's im-
munity claim, no further payments would be made. Id. On this point, the Court held that the
agreement, limited in nature as it was, left both parties with a considerable financial stake in the
resolution of the question presented to the Court. Id. at 2698. The Court therefore denied the
motion, declared the controversy to be live and moved on to the merits. Id. at 2699.
9° Id. at 2700.
91 This necessity was created by the fact that the Presidency did not exist through most
of the development of common law. Id. at 2701.
9° Id. In the past the Court noted, cases dealing with the immunity of public officials
had been decided by reference to the Constitution, federal statutes and history. Id. at 2700-01.
Where express congressional or constitutional guidance was absent, the Court continued, com-
mon law had also been utilized. Id. at 2701. The Court noted that in the past it had also weighed
"concerns of public policy, especially as illuminated by our history and the structure of our
government." Id. Since the creation of the Presidency antedated the development of most of the
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liability resulting from implied causes of action, absent any explicit statutory
right of action created by Congress. 93 The Court then proceeded to consider
whether absolute immunity was dictated by the unique position created for the
President in the Constitution of the United States," what the proper scope of
the absolute immunity afforded should be," and whether this grant of immuni-
ty would deny aggrieved parties adequate relief. 96
1. The President's Unique Constitutional Status
The Court began its analysis of presidential immunity by describing the
unique position the President occupies in the constitutional scheme." Article II
of the United States Constitution, the Court observed, provides that the ex-
ecutive power be vested in the office of the President." The Court then
delineated the nature of this executive power,,determining that the President's
responsibilities were threefold. First, the Court noted, the President must
faithfully execute the federal laws. 99 Second, the Court continued, the Presi-
dent must oversee the conduct of foreign affairs — an area in which particular-
ly broad judicial deference must be granted.'" Third, the Court explained, he
must manage the Executive branch.'°' Thus, the Court concluded, the Con-
stitution established the President as the chief constitutional officer of the ex-
ecutive branch and entrusted to him the government's most sensitive super-
visory and policy making responsibilities.'"
In light of these responsibilities, the Nixon Court rejected Fitzgerald's
argument that the President is entitled only to the same qualified immunity
granted to other state and federal executive officers.'" What distinguished the
President from those other officials, the Court reasoned, was his unique con-
common law, the Court reasoned, any historical analysis must rely on the Constitution. Id.
"Historical inquiry," the Court added, "thus merges almost at its inception with the kind of
`public policy' analysis appropriately undertaken by a federal court." Id. The Court concluded
that "this inquiry involves policies and principles that may be considered implicit in the nature of
the President's office in a system structured to achieve effective government under a constitu-
tionally mandated separation of powers." Id.
93 Id. at 2701 n.27.
" Id. at 2702, 2703.
93
96 Id.
" Id. at 2702.
98 Id.
99 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
i°° See id. (quoting Chicago and S. Airlines Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103,
111 (1948)).
'" Id. The Court noted that this was a task for which "imperative reasons requir[e] an
unrestricted power [in the President] to remove the most important of his subordinates in their
most important duties." Id. (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 134-35 (1926)).
'°' Id.
1 " Id. at 2702. Fitzgerald relied on the two cases granting qualified immunity only to
governors and cabinet officers — Buzz and Scheuer. Id. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying
text.
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stitutional status.'" The Court then specified two particular consequences
stemming from this unique status. First, the Court stressed that the President,
like judges and prosecutors for whom absolute immunity exists, deals with
matters likely to arouse the most intense feelings.'" Given the sensitive and
far-reaching nature of the authority vested in the office, the Court noted, 106 the
President is an easily identifiable target for civil suits.'" The Court considered
particularly persuasive the notion that this prospect of imminent suits might
render the President unduly cautious in the discharge of his official duties.'"
This distraction from his duties, the Court reasoned, would be detrimental
both to the President and, more importantly, to the nation.'"
The second consequence of the President's unique status according to the
Court was that the judicial branch had traditionally exercised singular restraint
and deference in its dealings with him."° The Court noted that it had previous-
ly recognized that presidential privilege was rooted in the constitutional separa-
tion of powers."' The Court also determined, however, that limitations on this
privilege were necessary."' Thus, the Court declared that the separation of
powers doctrine does not bar every exercise of jurisdiction over the
President.'" Nevertheless, the Court stressed that before exercising jurisdic-
tion a court must balance the constitutional interest served by doing so against
the dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive
branch." 4 As a result, the Court continued, assumption of jurisdiction is war-
ranted only where judicial action serves to maintain the separation of powers,
104 Id.
100 Id at 2703 (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)).
I" Id. at 2703.
107 Id. The Court stated that these dangers are significant even absent numerous suits
historically, since there was no cause of action before BUJ= was decided in 1971. Id. at 2703
n.33.
'" Id. at 2703 n.32. The Court quoted Judge Learned Hand in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177
F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950): "The justification for ... [deny-
ing recovery] is that it is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until the case has
been tried, and to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of trial and
the danger of its outcome would dampen the arder of all but the most resolute...." Nixon v.
Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2703 n.33 (1982).
109
 Id. at 2703.
110 Id. The Court noted that this tradition runs throughout Constitutional history. Id. at
2703 n.34 (citing Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 501 (1866) (court has no
jurisdiction over bill to enjoin the President in performance of official duties); Kendall v. United
States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 622 (1838) (President beyond reach of other branches except as
regards impeachment)).
11 Id. at 2704 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974)).
"2 See id.
113 Id. (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974); United States v. Burr,
25 F. Cas. 187, 191, 196 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694). Cf. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Secretary of Commerce enjoined from carrying out direct
presidential order)).
"6 Id. (citing Nixon v. General Services Admin., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977); United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-13 (1974)).
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not where such action derogates it.'" Balancing those factors in Nixon, the
Court held that a mere private suit for damages'" based on the President's of-
ficial actions did not warrant an exercise of jurisdiction.'"
Chief Justice Burger wrote a separate concurrence to stress this separation
of powers argument.'" The Chief Justice emphasized that presidential im-
munity differed from that accorded judges and prosecutors, since absolute im-
munity for the President is constitutionally mandated by the independence of
the co-equal branches, 19 while other forms of immunity derive from the com-
mon law."° Using a balancing test similar to the majority's ,' 2 ' the Chief
Justice concluded that the necessity of preventing significant invasions of the
executive function by the judiciary was far more important than the need to
permit an individual civil action. 122
 Burger therefore concurred in the Court's
decision. The Court majority, having dealt with Fitzgerald's contention that
limited immunity would suffice, next directed its attention to the boundaries
within which the immunity it granted the President would be absolute.
2. The Scope of Absolute Immunity
The Nixon Court recognized that to keep the absolute immunity accorded
the President within acceptable limits the boundaries of that protection must
relate closely to the justifying purposes of the immunity itself. 123
 Having deter-
mined that presidential immunity is mandated by the need to preserve the
President's unique power and to respect a coordinate branch's independent
authority, the Nixon Court reasoned that the scope of the protection need only
be broad enough to secure those considerations." 4 Absolute immunity of the
President in this situation, the Court noted, would therefore be limited to those
acts relating to the particular functions of his office.'" Nevertheless the Court
"5 Id. (citing Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)). In ad-
dition to maintaining the separation of powers, the Court stated that it will also find jurisdiction
to vindicate the public interest in an ongoing criminal invesigation. Id. (citing United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)).
116 The Court noted that it has historically recognized a lesser public interst in actions
for civil damages than in criminal prosecutions. Id. at 2704 n.37 (citing United States v. Gillock,
445 U.S 360, 371-73 (1980); United States v. Nixon, 518 U.S. 683, 711-12 & n.19 (1974)).
" 7 Id. at 2704. In footnote 37, the Court refuted the notion raised by the dissenters that
every legal wrong gives rise to a remedy in civil damages, citing a variety of examples to the con-
trary. The Court concluded that "in this case it was clear at least that Fitzgerald was entitled to
seek a remedy before the Civil Service Commission — a remedy of which he availed himself."
Id. at 2704 n.37.
" a Id. at 2706-09 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
119 Id. at 2707 & n.2 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
"° Id. at 2707 n.2 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
1" See id. at 2708 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
122 Id. at 2708 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
' 2' Id. at 2705.
124 Id
125 Id.
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made it clear that it would avoid drawing arbitrarily fine lines,' 26 and would in-
stead recognize absolute immunity within the "outer perimeter" of his official
responsibility.'"
Applying this limiting concept to the facts in Nixon, the Court concluded
that President Nixon's actions lay well within "outer perimeter" of presiden-
tial authority."° The Court therefore rejected Fitzgerald's contention that, in
allegedly firing him without cause, Nixon acted beyond his authority. 129 The
Court also stated that it considered the version of the 'functional comparabili-
ty" test proposed by Fitzgerald and the dissenters to involve a highly intrusive
and unnecessary inquiry into the President's motives.' 30 The Court noted that
the construction of the outer perimeter urged by Fitzgerald, which would ex-
clude from its protection any government official acting contrary to a federal
statute, would render absolute immunity meaningless."' The Court added
that the President surely had the authority to tell the Secretary how to run the
Air Force. 132 Having described the scope of presidential immunity, the Court
answered the dissenters' charges that this immunity would place the President
above the law by detailing other methods of remedying abuses of executive
autho rity . 133
3. The Existence of Other Remedies
The Court pointed to the existence of alternative remedies, designed to
protect the nation, as both a safeguard against the President being above the
law and as further justification for allowing absolute presidential immunity in
Nixon v. Fiagerald.' 34 These alternatives, the Court noted, had also been
recognized as justification in previous absolute immunity decisions. 1 S 5 The
Court identified a number of these alternatives, including impeachment,' 36 the
126 Id. (citing Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896) (privilege extends to all mat-
ters "committed by law to Ian official's] control or supervision"); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564,
575 (1959) (action within outer perimeter of job justified privilege); Stump v, Sparkman, 435
U.S. 349, 363 & n.12 (1978) (judicial privilege extends to acts outside "the normal attributes of a
judicial proceeding.")).
127 Id. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
129 Id.
129 Id, Fitzgerald cited 5 U.S.C. 	 7512(a) (1976), which allows firing only for such
cause as will promote the efficiency of the service, and argued that since Congress granted this
protection, no federal official could ignore it and be within the outer perimeter. Id.
10 Id. Fitzgerald said he was fired in retaliation for his testimony to Congress. Id. The
Air Force called it an efficiency move. Id. If Nixon ordered this move, the Court would then have
to examine his motives in so doing. This the Court was reluctant to do. Id. See supra note 165 and
accompanying text.
"' See id. See supra note 127.
12 Id. (citing 10 U.S.C. § 8012(b) (1970)).
'" Id. at 2706 & n.41.
"4 See id. at 2706.
133 Id. at 2706 n.38 (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 428-29 (1976) (immunity
of prosecutors does not leave public powerless)).
136 Id. at 2706. The Court noted that this same remedy applies to judges and con-
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constant scrutiny of the press,'" and the deterrent effect of congressional over-
sight.'" Furthermore, the Court stated that a President not only is concerned
with possible re-election and how history will regard him, but also needs to
maintain prestige to govern effectively." 9 In light of these checks on presiden-
tial abuses of power and the limitation of the scope of the immunity to official
functions,'" the Nixon majority disagreed with the dissenting justices that their
holding places the President above the law."'
Due to the President's unique status and the separation of powers in the
Constitution, therefore, the Court held that the President was absolutely im-
mune from civil damage liability predicated upon the violation of an in-
dividual's constitutional, non-statutory rights.'" Thus, the Court reversed the
decision of the court of appeals and remanded the case for action consistent
with its opinion. 143
B. The Dissenters' Analysis
Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun,
dissented in Nixon v. Fitzgerald.'" The dissenters declared that the majority's
grant of absolute immunity to all actions within the outer perimeter of the
President's duties — rather than to just specific presidential functions which
demanded such immunity — was contrary to the holding in Butzw that ab-
solute immunity attaches only to specific functions and not to the office of the
official involved.' 46 The dissenters contrasted the absolute immunity granted
the President by the Court with that granted judges and prosecutors. The im-
munity of judges and prosecutors, the dissenters contended, applies only to
their specific, respective functions and is, therefore, not absolute.'" The
Court, according to the dissenters, had abandoned the functional analysis of
immunity used in all prior decisions and had substituted a subjective policy
gressmen. Id. at 2706 n.39 (citing Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE L.J. 681,
690-706 (1979); U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 5, d. 2).
197 Id. at 2706.
113 Id. The Court noted that the House Judiciary Committee had already begun im-
peachment proceedings when Nixon resigned. Id. at 2706 n.40.
199 Id. at 2706.
"° Id. at 2701.
" I Id. at 2706 & n.41, The Court, responding to the dissenters' argument that absolute
immunity would make the President above the law, concluded that an official was not above the
law simply because a particular remedy does not apply to him. Id.
142 Id. at 2701 & n.27.
1 " Id. at 2706.
' 44 Id. at 2710 (White J., dissenting).
"5 438 U.S. 478 (1978). Justice White authored the Court's opinion in Butz.
146. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2710 (1982). (White, J., dissenting). The
dissenters added that the decision " ... makes no effort to distinguish categories of presidential
conduct that should be absolutely immune from other categories of conduct that should not
qualify for that level of immunity." Id. (White, J., dissenting).
' 4' Id. (White, J., dissenting).
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choice.'" The Court had supported that policy choice, the dissenters noted,
with both history and the constitutional tradition of the separation of powers. 149
History, however, did not support absolute immunity in the view of the
dissenters; they quoted Senator Pinckney and Mr. Wilson, both members of
the Constitutional Convention, to show that no immunity was intended for the
President.'" As for the constitutional separation of powers argument, the
dissenters argued that the Court had actually combined it with the public
policy argument for absolute immunity, rather than using it to support that
policy argument. 15 ' According to, the dissent, the absolute immunity granted
the President places the President above the law.' 52
 The real test, in this case as
in past cases, the dissenters concluded, was to examine the challenged in-
dividual function of the official and to weigh the need for absolute immunity for
that function only against the right of the individual plaintiff to a civil
remedy.' 53
According to the dissenters, the only question that needed to be deter-
mined, therefore, was whether dismissal of employees is a constitutionally
assigned executive function which would be significantly impaired if a civil
damage remedy was allowed.'" The answer to that question, the dissenters
stated, was no. 155
 Rather, the dissenters continued, since Congress had in-
tervened statutorily to protect federal employees,' 56 public policy actually sug-
gested that the executive branch be restrained in this area.'" Nor, added the
dissenters, should the President be absolutely immune , from a Bivens implied
right of action,'" since the Butz decision recognized that absolute immunity for
all government officials in an implied cause of action would drain Bivens of all
148
 Id. at 2712 (White, J., dissenting).
149 Id. (White, J., dissenting). The dissenters therefore read the decision to be "a con-
stitutional pronouncement — absolute immunity for the President's office is mandated by the
Constitution." Id. (White, J., dissenting). Despite the fact that the majority had disclaimed this
result, see id. at 2701 n.27, the dissenters stated that the decision could only be read that way. Id.
at 2712. (White, J., dissenting).
i 5° Id. at 2715, 2716. (White, J., dissenting). The dissenters protested that the Court's
approach assumed immunity and put the burden on Fitzgerald to demonstrate that it did not ex-
ist. Id. at 2714 n.13. (White, J., dissenting). The dissenters declared nothing in the debates
specifically suggested that notion. Id. (White, J., dissenting). The dissenters further argued that
the focus of the entire debate had been on situations where the President had committed wrongs
against the state, not against individuals. Id. at 2714. (White, J., dissenting). Overall, the
dissenters concluded that history contributed nothing to the immunity issue, and that the Court
had conceded this by dropping its historical analysis into a footnote. Id. at 2717. (White, J.,
dissenting).
131 Id. at 2717. (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2711. (White, J., dissenting).
"3 Id. at 2720. (White, J., dissenting).
I34
 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
I33
 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
t" See 5 U.S.C. 5 7211 (1976); 18 U.S.C. 5 1505 (1964). See supra note 33.
' 5' See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2721-22 (1982). (White, J., dissenting).
i" See supra note 6 and accompanying text. See infra note 207 and accompanying text.
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meaning. 159
 In conclusion, the dissenters stated that no function deserving of
absolute immunity was involved in this case.'"
III. THE NIXON HOLDING IN THE CONTEXT OF PREVIOUS
IMMUNITY DECISIONS
Although its language regarding the President's "unique status" initially
may appear inconsistent with previous Court pronouncements on the immuni-
ty accorded government officials, Nixon a. Fitzgerald is actually in harmony with
those decisions. As is the case with the President in Nixon, past decisions have
generally limited the immunity granted — whether qualified or absolute — to
actions taken in the performance of the particular official's duties."' One
critical distinction between the two types of immunity is that under qualified
immunity, the courts must determine whether "good faith" exists,' 62 Thus, a
defendant official must answer pleadings and bear discovery expenses even if
he eventually succeeds in getting the case dismissed. Conversely, under ab-
solute immunity, the defendant official's liability is precluded immediately and
entirely, and the burden of litigation is avoided. 163 In deciding whether to grant
qualified or absolute immunity, the Supreme Court has consistently looked at
the public interest behind the immunity accorded the particular official.'"
The Court's holding in Nixon was predictable, therefore, because of the
functional comparability of the duties of the President to those of other officials
in which the Court had found sufficient public interest to warrant absolute im-
munity.' 65 Moreover, the Nixon Court's separation of powers argument simply
.' Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2722 (1982) (citing Butz v. Economou, 438
U.S. 478 (1978)).
160 Id. at 2721, 2723 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall, also wrote a separate dissent, These dissenters contended that the settlement
arrangement between the parties if it had been fully disclosed to the Justices, would have led to
the denial of certiorari. Id. at 2727 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). They therefore would have
dismissed the writ as being improvidently granted. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Since
dismissal did not occur, however, all of these dissenters joined in the reasoning of Justice White's
dissent. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
16 ' Qualified and absolute immunity are the two types of immunity available for govern-
ment officials. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text. Qualified immunity applies general-
ly to both state and federal government officials in the performance of their official functions and
protects them when they act in good faith. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508-17 (1978). Ab-
solute immunity, in contrast, is granted to certain state and federal government officials who per-
form especially sensitive functions. Id. at 508. It provides a full exemption from liability for ac-
tions taken in the broad exercise of their official duties, regardless of bad faith or malicious intent.
See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871).
162 See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
"3 See PROSSER, supra note 2, at 970.
164 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1977).
"3 Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2703 (1982). The Court arrived at its decision
by way of a "functional comparability" test. Id. at 2701 & n.27 (1982). Under this approach,
first used by the Court in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 508, the Court compares the
characteristics of the office of the defendant official to those of officials it has previously accorded
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buttressed the absolute immunity holding as a second, distinct rationale for ac-
cording the President such protection. Indeed, Supreme Court decisions re-
garding immunity of public officials follow a logical progression from a
threshold consideration of whether any immunity exists, to an analysis of
whether that protection is the qualified immunity granted most officials or the
absolute immunity accorded certain officials where the public interest demands
it. 166
 A detailed analysis of this progression, along with an examination of the
factors pertinent to each level of immunity, reveals that Nixon v. Fitzgerald fits
within the absolute immunity doctrine established by the Court.
A. The Threshold Inquiry into the Existence of Immunity
Running consistently throughout the Court's prior immunity decisions is
the notion that immunity, either qualified or absolute, would only be granted
to• a public official' who was performing an official function of his office. In
Bradley u. Fisher' 67
 the Court considered the immunity granted a judge at com-
mon law. The Court noted that absolute immunity would only be denied when
the judge acted knowingly in the clear absence of any jurisdiction at all, not
merely when he acted in excess of his jurisdiction.' 68 In Spalding v. Vilas'" the
Court examined the immunity of the Postmaster General from civil suit in a
common law action."° The Court implied that when the Postmaster General
acted in matters manifestly beyond his authority he would not be protected by
immunity."' Similarly, in Imbler v. Pachtman, 172
 involving a prosecutor seeking
immunity from a civil suit, the Court concluded that the prosecutor's immuni-
ty would be absolute — like that accorded judges — as long as he acted within
the scope of his duties.'"
The Court has stressed, however, that the boundary line delimiting of-
ficial action will not be drawn arbitrarily, but will allow a broad discretionary
scope. For example, in Bradley v. Fisher, the absolute immunity granted by the
Court applied even when the judicial acts were done maliciously and in excess
of the judge's jurisdiction."' Likewise, in Spalding v. Vilas, the Court stated
that actions more or less connected with general matters committed by law to
absolute immunity, such as judges and prosecutors. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. at 2703. In
situations where the official demonstrates that public policy interests equal to those justifying ab-
solute immunity for judges and prosecutors favor application of that immunity to his office, ab-
solute immunity will be granted. Id.
166
 See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 485-517; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,
238-50 (1974).
167 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
168 Id. at 351.
168 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
170 Id. at 484, 498-99.
171 Id.
172 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
'3 Id. at 416, 422-31.
17 ' Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1871).
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the Postmaster General's supervision were protected by absolute immunity." 5
Furthermore, in Barr v. Matteo,' 76 where former employees of a government
agency sued the agency's deputy director for libel, the Court found that since
the deputy director's actions were taken within the outer perimeter of his
duties, absolute immunity was triggered.'" Although the Court has not de-
fined precisely where it will draw the line in any of these cases, its method of
analysis in determining absolute judicial liability can be applied to give some
indication as to what the outer perimeter of absolute presidential immunity
might be.
In the Court's analysis of judicial immunity, its initial inquiry in deter-
mining whether a judge will have absolute immunity in civil damage actions is
a jurisdictional one.' 78 As long as a judge does not act in the clear absence of
jurisdiction, he will have absolute immunity for his judicial acts even when
those acts are malicious and in excess of jurisdiction.'" To determine whether
the judge's challenged acts are "judicial," however, an additional analytical
step is necessary.'" The Court must examine both the nature of the act itself to
determine whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and the ex-
pectations of the parties involved to determine whether they dealt with the
judge in his official capacity."' If any jurisdiction over the challenged act ex-
ists, and that act is a "judicial" one, the Court will grant the judge absolute
immunity.'" Thus, a longstanding line of immunity decisions by the Court
establish the threshold inquiry to be whether the acts sued upon lie within the
broad scope of duties committed to the defendant official's responsibility.
In Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the Court utilized a similar method of analysis when
it recognized presidential immunity for official acts within the outer perimeter
of that office's responsibilityl" and then found that the President had acted
well within this outer perimeter.'" In so doing, the Court rejected Fitzgerald's
contention that, because Congress had granted legislative protection to govern-
ment employees, no federal official could fire him without cause."' Instead,
the Court determined that the President was authorized to prescribe how the
Air Force would be run, and this authority covered reorganizations and reduc-
tions in force.'" Since the President in Nixon acted under statutory authority
"3 Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498-99 (1896).
I 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
'" Id. at 575.
"a See Note, Judicial Immunity: Developments in Federal Law, 33 BAYLOR L. REV 350, 355
(1981).
"9 Id.
1 " Id. at 354.
181 Id.
"2 Id. at 355.
"3 Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2705 (1982).
184 Id.
1 " Id.
1136 Id. (citing 10 U.S.C.	 8012(b) (1970)).
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enacted to define his constitutional power,'" he had jurisdiction over the
challenged action and was acting in an official executive capacity. The negative
implication of the Nixon Court's reasoning, however, is that, if the President
had acted knowing that no constitutional or statutory power existed, or that his
actions were not among those official functions normally performed by a presi-
dent, he would not have been protected by absolute immunity. Moreover, the
Court specifically stated that prior immunity cases had limited the officials' ab-
solute immunity to acts in performance of the particular assigned functions of
their offices.'" In finding that some form of immunity existed, the Court had
therefore apparently utilized the same limitations established in its prior im-
munity decisions to find that the President in Nixon had acted within the outer
perimeter of his official duties. The presence of the separation of powers argu-
ment in Nixon does not seem to have affected the scope of the outer perimeter of
the immunity granted the President, since the delineation of the outer
perimeter arose in prior immunity decisions unaffected by separation of powers
concerns. 189
B. The Subsequent Consideration of the Type of Immunity
The more difficult question facing the Court was the kind of immunity to
grant the President. Fitzgerald argued that the President was entitled to only
the qualified immunity granted governors and cabinet officers.' 94 The Court
rejected this argument and instead pointed to the President's unique status and
the constitutional separation of powers doctrine as justification for granting the
President absolute immunity. ' 9 ' The Nixon Court's grant of absolute immunity
can be understood best by first examining the two major cases finding qualified
immunity for most government officials, then briefly reviewing the cases grant-
ing absolute immunity to certain other government officials and finally com-
paring Nixon with both sets of cases to show that the President falls squarely
within the category of officials protected by absolute immunity.
1. The Qualified Immunity Category
In Scheuer v. Rhodes ,' 92 representatives of the estates of the students killed in
demonstrations at Kent State University sued the Governor of Ohio and others
"7 Id.
188 Id.
199 This is not to say that the separation of powers doctrine is not an important element
of Nixon. See infra note 303 and accompanying text. The separation of powers doctrine helped lead
the Court in Nixon to grant absolute immunity to the President. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct.
at 2702-04. The doctrine was not needed, however, to define the boundaries of that grant, since
those boundaries came from the common law.
ix) Id.
191 Id. at 2702-04
199 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
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under a federal civil rights statute — 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (section 1983) 193 — for
calling out the National Guard and ordering performance of acts that resulted
in student deaths.'" The plaintiffs argued that the Governor had violated the
constitutional rights of the deceased students by his official acts.'" The Gov-
ernor raised the defense of absolute immunity.I 96 The Court held that the pro-
tection accorded a state executive officer for his official acts is not absolute, but
instead is a qualified, good faith immunity.' 97 In defining this qualified im-
munity, the Court stated that an executive officer will be immune from liability
for his official acts if he had reasonable grounds under all the facts and cir-
cumstances existing at the time of his action to form a good faith belief in the
validity of his conduct.'" To grant absolute immunity and make the official's
actions judicially unreviewable, the Court noted, would drain section 1983 of
meaning.' 99
Standing alone, Scheuer v. Rhodes presumably would have had little impact
on the decision in Nixon v. Fitzgerald. Since the Scheuer Court's analysis focused
on the immunity granted a state official acting under color of state authority,
the case could have been readily distinguished from Fitzgerald's causes of ac-
tion against a federal executive official in Nixon. In Butz v. Economou, 2°°
however, the Court considered for the first time the type of immunity granted
federal executive officials sued for constitutional violations, 201 and adopted the
Scheuer rationale."' In Butz, the United States Department of Agriculture had
tried unsuccessfully to revoke or suspend the registration of Economou's com-
modity futures commission company.'" Economou then filed an action for
damages against the Secretary and others, alleging that by instituting
unauthorized proceedings against him, those federal officials had violated a
variety of his constitutional rights.'" The Butz Court held that_in a suit for
in 42 U.S.C. S 1983 (1976). Section 1983 makes every "person" liable who, under col-
or of state law, deprives another person of his civil rights. 42 U.S.C. S 1983 (1976).
194 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 234-35 (1974).
195 Id.
196 Id.
' 97 Id. at 247-48. The Scheuer Court noted that while the legislative branch was expressly
granted absolute immunity in Article I, Section 6 of the Constitution, immunity for the executive
and judicial branches remained a common law function. Id. at 241 (citing Spalding v. Vilas, 161
U.S. 483, 498-99 (1896)). The public interest in decisive action by government officials required
some immunity, id. at 242, but the legislative history of section 1983 indicated that the immunity
should not be absolute. Id. at 243 (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961)).
' 9$ Id. at 243.
199 Id. at 248.
200 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
201 Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2700 (1982). The Nixon Court, however, did
distinguish Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896), on the fact that the Spalding suit (against the
Postmaster General) was based on a common law, and not a constitutional, cause of action. Id. at
2700 n.25.
202 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978).
203 Id. at 480-81.
2" Id. at 481-83.
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damages based on an alleged unconstitutional action, federal executive officials
acting in the scope of their official duties are entitled only to the qualified im-
munity specified in Scheuer v. Rhodes. 205 The Court noted that exceptions would
be made to grant certain officials — such as judges and prosecutors — absolute
immunity when it was demonstrated that such protection is essential to the
public interest. 206
 The Court found that Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Agents 207
had created an implied .civil damage remedy against federal agents for constitu-
tional violations wherein the agents had only qualified immunity. 2" Just as the
Scheuer Court had granted state executive officials only qualified immunity to
preserve the meaning of a section 1983 action, 209 the Butz Court limited the im-
munity granted federal officials to preserve the cause of action created in
Bivens. 21 ° The Court reasoned that while public policy needs and public interest
allowed for qualified immunity to protect officials in the vigorous exercise of
discretionary, official authority,'" there would be no protection for an official
knowingly acting outside statutory or constitutional limitations. 212 The Butz
Court stated, therefore, that the qualified, good faith immunity detailed in
Scheuer would protect all federal officials generally. 2"
2. The Absolute Immunity Category
While limiting its holding to the immunity granted the officials before it,
the Butz Court recognized that certain officials, including but not limited to
judges and prosecutors, would have special duties requiring absolute immuni-
ty. 2 " The Court noted, however, that those federal officials seeking absolute
immunity would bear the burden of showing that public policy requires the ap-
plication of the broader immunity. 21 Moreover, the Butz Court declared that
officials seeking absolute immunity must demonstrate the functional com-
2°' Id. at 507. Both Butz and Nixon involve constitutional actions against government of-
ficials. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896), granting the Postmaster General absolute im-
munity in a common law suit, has never been overruled and is apparently still good law. If,
therefore, a government official were to be sued on common law grounds, it appears that the of-
ficial would still be absolutely immune.
2" Id. at 508-09.
"7 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Bivens, federal narcotics agents, without a warrant or prob-
able cause, searched Bivens' apartment and arrested him on a narcotics charge. Id. at 389. The
Bivens Court held that there was an implied federal cause of action under the fourth amendment
against the federal officials. See id. at 397.
"a See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 486 (1978).
202 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 248 (1974).
210 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 501 (1978). In so doing, the Court adopted the
reasoning of various federal courts of appeals that it would be incongruous and confusing to
develop different standards of immunity for state officials in section 1983 actions and federal of-
ficials sued on similar grounds in direct constitutional actions. Id. at 499, 500.
2" Id. at 506.
212 See id. at 506-07.
213
	 at 507.
214 Id. at 508-09.
215 Id. at 506.
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parability of their duties to those officials — judges and prosecutors —
previously granted absolute immunity; an official's level in government will
not alone be sufficient. 2" To demonstrate adequately that the President's
duties are indeed functionally comparable to those officials previously granted
absolute immunity, it is first necessary to review briefly prior absolute immuni-
ty cases and focus on the facts distinguishing them from qualified immunity
cases.
In Bradley v. Fisher, 217 an attorney brought a civil suit against a state judge
for striking his name from the rolls of the attorneys allowed to practice in the
criminal court of the district. 2 " The Supreme Court held that judges are not
liable in civil actions for such judicial acts, even when done maliciously and in
excess of their jurisdiction. 219 The Court stated that this principle of absolute
immunity obtains for judges in all countries with a well-ordered system of
jurisprudence, 220 and that it had deep roots in the common law22 ' and the
English courts. 222 The Court added that the motives of the judge are
irrelevant. 223 The historical reasoning behind granting judges this immunity,
the Bradley Court noted, was that judges deal with those controversies involving
not only great amounts of money, but also the liberty of the parties, both of
which tend to excite the most intense feelings. 224 If civil actions could be main-
tained against judges, the Court continued, their independence in emotional
cases would be destroyed and the public interest in that independence
harmed. 225 The Court found that in the United States, judges are responsible
only to the people 226 and if their actions are corrupt or malicious, judges are
subject to impeachment. 227 Thus, so long as a judge acts within the outer
boundaries of his jurisdiction — as opposed to knowingly acting without any
jurisdiction at al1228 — the Bradley Court concluded that absolute immunity
would bar civil damage liability229 and impeachment would be the sole
remedy. 23 °
These considerations raised in Bradley — that the decisions of certain
public officials have far-reaching emotional impact, and that the greatest public
interest exists in providing such officials with maximum independence to act
2"6 Id. at 511-12.
217 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
"8 Id. at 336-37.
219
 Id. at 347, 357.
228 Id. at 347.
221 Id.
222 Id.
113 Id.
224
 Id. at 348.
225 Id. at 348-49.
226
 Id. at 350.
227 Id.
228 Id at 352, 353.
229 See id. at 347.
23° Id. at 354.
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boldly and decisively — run consistently through subsequent cases granting
absolute immunity. In Spalding v. Vilas, 25 ' the Court granted the Postmaster
General absolute immunity from suits founded on common law actions, find-
ing that the same general public reasons which demanded absolute immunity
for judges mandated absolute immunity for executive officials. 232 The Court
added that to hold otherwise would seriously cripple the proper and effective
administration of public affairs as entrusted to the executive by the people. 233
Moreover, in several later cases, the Court indicated that the passage of 8
U.S.C. § 43 and its later codification 42 U.S.C. 1983, which stemmed from
an 1871 Act designed to effectuate the fourteenth amendment234 did not
abrogate the absolute immunity historically accorded certain public officials in
the public interest. 235 The Court stressed the public interest in courageous, in-
dependent actions by such government officials 236 as well as the potential
dangers to the public which could result if civil suits were to distract such of-
ficials from the performance of their public duties. 237
3. The President's Immunity Category
The Court in Nixon v. Fitzgerald correctly found that the President, under
the Butz test, 238 had demonstrated the functional comparability of his duties to
those of judges and prosecutors, officials previously granted absolute immuni-
ty. The President has the broadest powers and deals with matters exciting the
most intense feelings of any official in our constitutional system of government,
far more so than judges and prosecutors. 239 The Constitution specifically
assigns the President very important duties, including management of the Ex-
ecutive branch, 24° command of the armed forces"' and enforcemen6 of the
federal laws. 242 In addition, the President, arguably, today represents the na-
tional interest — "the people" in our constitutional form of government. 243 He
2" 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
234
	
at 498-99. See supra, note 214.
"3 Id
234 The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, 5 99, 16 Stat. 433.
2" See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420-31 (1976) (state prosecutor ab-
solutely immune from liability under section 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 (1976) for prosecutorial
functions); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967) (state judge absolutely immune from
suits under 42 U.S.C. $ 1983 for judicial acts); Tenney v. Bradhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951)
(state legislators absolutely immune from civil action after the passage of 8 U.S.C. 5 43 (1946),
the predecessor of 5 1983).
"6 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 (1976).
237 Id.
233 See supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
239 See infra notes 247-58 and accompanying text.
249 See U.S. CONST. art. II, 5 1.
!" Id. art. II, 5 2.
262 Id. art. II, $ 3.
263
 R. PIOUS, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 48 (1979) [hereinafter cited as PIOUS]. See
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 633 (1952) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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claims, therefore, the sovereign powers of the nation, including the vast
residuum of federal powers that are neither enumerated nor constitutionally
assigned to any branch and often succeeds in attaining those powers. 244 This
combination of constitutionally assigned and prerogative powers 245 covers a
broad range of domestic and foreign policy matters, and involves the President
in a great many decisions on highly sensitive issues . 2 " A brief description of
those matters with which the President is involved highlights the scope and
widespread effect of his official acts.
The Constitution charges the President with the duty of making a State of
the Union address to Congress, 242 a duty which has become an annual state-
ment of the foreign and domestic policy goals of the President.'" Shortly after
this address the President is required by congressional act 249 to submit to Con-
gress for approval the executive budget, compiled by the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget to carry out the President's goals. 25° This authority to control
the budget, if approved in a form similar to the form submitted, is a vital
domestic power of the President. 25 ' If the Chief Executive can control spending
levels, he can better control the departments and agencies that make up the Ex-
ecutive branch, distribute agency funds to allies in the states and thereby in-
fluence national fiscal policy. 252
It is in the field of foreign affairs, however, that the President is granted
the most sweeping powers. 253
 In addition to his constitutionally granted title of
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, 2 S 4 the President has further as-
sumed a general power to conduct foreign relations — while the role of Con-
244 See Pious, supra note 243, at 47-84. See also Youngstown Sheet St- Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). Jackson described three situations in which a
president acts: pursuant to express congressional authorization, in the absence of either a con-
gressional grant or denial of authority and directly contrary to congressional will. Id. at 635-38.
When Congress has not acted, Jackson stated that the President relies on his own independent
power. Id. at 637. In this gray area, Jackson continued, congressional inaction enables, indeed
invites the President to act on his own authority. Id. Jackson then described as an example of this
line of reasoning a situation in which President Lincoln suspended the writ of habeus corpus and
succesfully asserted that he was performing an executive function, although the Constitution was
silent on which branch had the power to act in that situation. Id. at 637 n.3.
245
 Prerogative powers are those federal powers claimed by the President over foreign
and domestic policy matters in situations where the Constitution does not assign the powers to
any branch. See Pious, supra note 243, at 48.
2" See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
2" U.S. CONST. art. II, S'3. Section 3 states that the President "shall from time to time
give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union." Id.
240
	 Pious, supra note 243, at 157-58.
549
 The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, 5 206 42 Stat. 20, 2, 31 U.S.C. 5 1 (1970).
550
 See Pious, supra note 243, at 257-58.
"' Id. at 256-57.
252 Id.
453 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (President is
sole organ of nation in foreign affairs and sole representative with foreign nations).
"4 U.S. CONST. art. II, 5 2. This section provides in part that "The President shall be
commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States...." Id.
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gress in this area has been narrowly limited to constitutionally enumerated
duties. 255 The President through his Secretary of State, is the sole organ of
communication with foreign powers. 255 The President controls and classifies all
secret information regarding national security obtained by military, diplomatic
and intelligence agencies. 257 The President negotiates treaties with foreign
powers and can make unapproved, treaty-like executive agreements. 259 Final-
ly, the President can use the armed forces in hostilities for short periods of time
without a declaration of war, under broad theories such as maintaining na-
tional security or upholding treaties. 259
This brief description of Presidential duties illustrates that the President
performs the broadest range of functions in the United States' constitutional
form of government, functions with consequences affecting many individuals,
both in the United States and abroad. Judges, already granted absolute im-
munity, do not approach in the execution of their office this same breadth and
magnitude of responsibilities. Essentially, judges are the ultimate arbiters of
the Constitution. 26° They do indeed rule on emotionally charged issues ranging
from the constitutionality of the death penalty 261 and abortion 262 to the respec-
tive powers of the three branches of government. 263 Federal courts, however,
deal only with legal issues properly before them in a case or controversy
while the President's actions cover a broad spectrum of domestic and foreign
policy concerns. 265 Given this wider ranging and potentially more controversial
presidential authority, the Nixon Court was entirely correct in recognizing that
the greatest public interest exists in providing the President with absolute im-
munity.
The Court was also correct in its reasoning that the President's unique
status affords him an unmatched visibility and makes him a ready target for
civil damage suits, the threat of which could lessen his effectiveness, and
255
	
Pious, supra note 243, at 333. See also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299
U.S, 304, 319 (1936) (President makes treaties with Senate advice and consent. President alone
negotiates treaties).
256 See Pious, supra note 243, at 334.
2S'
	 id. at 342-43.
258 Id. at 335, 340-41. Between 1946 and 1971, for example, the United States entered
361 treaties approved by the Senate and 5,559 executive agreements. Id. at 340.
"9 See id. at 373-74. The War Powers Resolution, passed by Congress in 1974, now
limits the use of United States armed forces by the President without a Congressional declaration
of war to sixty days. 50 U.S.C. 1544(b) (1974).
260 See Marbury v. Madison, 7 U.S. (1 Cranch) 368, 371-91 (1801).
261 E.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 426-33 (1980).
282 E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 147-67 (1972).
"' See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974); Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585-89 (1952).
264 U.S.
 CONST art. III, 5 2. See also J. NOwAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HAND-
BOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1-1 1 1 (1978). See also C. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman Corp.,
333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948) (Supreme Court does not give advisory opinions).
265 See supra notes 243-57 and accompanying text.
264, 
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thereby do harm to the nation he serves. 266
 Even a small sampling of the suits
for unconstitutional deprivations of rights brought against President Nixon in
the years following Bivens267
 reveals the myriad of potential avenues of suit
against the President. For example, in one case a former chemist at a Veterans
Administration hospital sued Nixon individually and in his capacity as Presi-
dent for violations of his first amendment rights to freedom of religion, com-
plaining that he resigned rather than face termination because of religious
discrimination. 266
 In another case, a private citizen sued President Nixon and
five hundred other named and unnamed government officials for deprivations
of constitutional rights by virtue of improper surveillance, false arrest and
unauthorized search and seizure.'" Class suits and individual taxpayer suits
were brought against the President to challenge the constitutionality of and en-
join expenditures for the war in Vietnam.'" In yet another case, a taxpayer
sued the President over an emergency act granting assistance to Israel, charg-
ing that it violated the establishment clause of the first amendment."'
Moreover, a widely syndicated columnist sued Nixon and eighteen other of-
ficials for constitutional infringements when the Watergate tapes revealed that
the President may have ordered his telephones wiretapped. 272
 Some of these
cases were dismissed due to lack of standing273 or failure to state a claim. 274
Other cases, however, dismissed the President as a party only because of
presidential immunity.'" One such court reasoned that the President should
not be distracted in his duties, particularly where other remedies were afforded
the plaintiff276
 — a point with which the Nixon Court agreed. 277 Significantly,
had the President been protected only by qualified immunity in such cases,
each would have proceeded at least through costly and time consuming
discovery procedures before dismissal would have been possible.'" In the case
of a complaint like Fitzgerald's — where a full litany of administrative
remedies existed and in fact relief was awarded 2" — the civil action was an un-
266
 Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2703 (1982).
267 See supra note 207 and accompanynig text.
268 See Harris v. Nixon, 325 F. Supp. 28, 29 (D. Cob. 1971).
269 See Reese v. Nixon, 347 F. Supp. 314, 315 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
270 See Meyers v. Nixon, 339 F. Supp. 1388, 1389-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Atlee v. Nixon,
336 F. Supp. 790, 791 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
271
	 Dickson v. Nixon, 379 F. Supp. 1345, 1346 (W.D. Tex. 1974).
272 See Anderson v. Nixon, 444 F. Supp. 1195, 1197 (D.D.C. 1978).
273 See Dickson v. Nixon, 379 F. Supp. 1345, 1348 (W.D. Tex. 1974).
274 Harris v. Nixon, 325 F. Supp. 28, 36 (D. Colo. 1971).
279 See Reese v. Nixon, 347 F. Supp. 314, 316-17 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Atlee v. Nixon, 336
F. Supp. 790, 791-92 (E.D. Pa. 1972). See also Meyers v. Nixon, 339 F. Supp. 1388, 1389-91
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (not reaching issue of executive immunity, but expressing agreement with
Atlee).
276
 Atlee v. Nixon, 336 F. Supp. 790, 792 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
2" See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2704 & n.37 (1982).
278 See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
279 See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2696, 2704 & nn.17 & 37. Fitzgerald re-
fused available administrative relief prior to inititating the instant proceeding. Id. at 2704.
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warranted intrusion on presidential authority which was properly avoided by
the grant of absolute immunity.
In Nixon, therefore, since the President's duties are more sensitive than
those of judges or prosecutors, and the public interest in uninhibited perform-
ances of those duties is greater than that present with respect to a judge's or
prosecutor's duties, the Court correctly found absolute immunity for the Presi-
dent. The functional comparability test set forth in Butz ,"° applied to the Presi-
dent, was in actuality all the justification needed by the Court to grant the
President absolute immunity from civil damage liability.
The dissenters in Nixon incorrectly applied the Butz test to the situation
presented by President Nixon's role in the firing of Fitzgerald. Their inquiry
would have involved looking only to see if the challenged function — the
dismissal of an employee — was constitutionally assigned to the President and
whether the performance of that function would be substantially impaired by
allowing Fitzgerald's civil suit."' The dissenters concluded that the answers to
both of those questions were no, and thus absolute immunity should not
apply."' The dissenters' analysis was faulty in two respects. First, the function
challenged in Nixon is assigned both constitutionally and statutorily to the
President. The Constitution specifically makes the President the Commander
in Chief of the Armed Forces and head of the Executive Branch."' In conjunc-
tion with federal statutory law, 284 the Constitution gives the President the
authority to direct the Secretary of the Air Force in matters involving the con-
duct of Air Force business."' Second, the dissenters construed the term "func-
tions" too narrowly. The dissenters contended that Butz may be read to grant
absolute immunity only to those specific functions performed by any particular
official for which the immunity is clearly essential.'" Butz, however, cited with
approval language from Bradley which held judges absolutely immune from
civil suits for malice or corruption in their actions while exercising judicial
functions within the general scope of their jurisdiction.'" In Bradley, a judge who
had been verbally maligned by an attorney struck the latter's name from the
rolls of attorneys allowed to practice in the criminal court of the district."'
Despite the nature of the judge's actions, he was granted absolute immunity.'"
Absolute immunity as granted to certain officials by the Court in prior deci-
sions does indeed apply only to the particular functions of the official's office.'"
2.3° Butz v. EcOnomou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978).
23 ' See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2720 (White, J., dissenting).
252 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
283 U.S. CONST. art. II, CS 1 & 2.
28+
	 U.S.C. S 8012(b) (1970).
285
	 v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct.,2690, 2705 (1982).
286 Id. at 2709-10 (White, J., dissenting).
257 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 509 (1978).
Bradley v. Fisher, BO U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 344 (1871).
209 Id. at 347, 357.
290 Id.
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Those functions, however, include all the duties generally assigned to that of-
ficial and have been broadly construed by the Court to include a wide range of
matters, 29 ' and would certainly include the challenged action in Nixon. By
declaring that judges have been granted absolute immunity only for judicial
functions, and not for criminal liability, 292 the dissenters incorrectly implied
that the Nixon majority found a broader application of absolute immunity for
the President. Contrary to the dissenters' conclusion, the Nixon Court
specifically limited its holdings to find absolute immunity for civil damage
liability only for acts within the outer perimeter of the President's official
duties.'"
In addition, the dissenters were incorrect in their conclusion that the ab-
solute immunity granted places the President above the law 294 and deprives
Fitzgerald of an adequate remedy. 295 The decision in Nixon leaves the President
subject to judicial process to vindicate the public interest in ongoing criminal
cases and in other constitutional confrontations where the public interest
demands that the separation of powers be maintained. 296 Further, all other
constitutional and historical protections, such as impeachment, legislative ac-
tions, press scrutiny and the desire to be re-elected remain. 297 Fitzgerald had
an administrative remedy that included reinstatement in the equivalent of his
old job and reimbursement for all back pay lost. 298 Given the protections af-
forded the nation and the individual in this case, the public interest in allowing
the President to perform his duties without the threat of civil damage liability
far outweighed any individual or public need for such liability.
4. The Importance of the Separation of Powers Argument
The second ground recognized by the Court for granting absolute im-
munity — the separation of powers doctrine299 — strengthened the holding,
but was not an essential element. The dissenters were correct in pointing out
that the Court merged the separation of power argument with the public policy
argument.' 0° Chief Justice Burger, in his concurrence, apparently reasoned
that the existence of the separation of powers argument alone afforded the
President absolute immunity and no discussion of prior immunity decisions
was necessary.' 01 The Court, on the other hand, used the separation of powers
argument as an additional justification for absolute immunity along with the
291 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508-17 (1978).
292 Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2710 (White, J., dissenting).
295 See id. at 2705.
294 Id. at 2711 (White, J., dissenting).
293 See id. at 2719 (White, J., dissenting).
296 Id. at 2704.
297 Id. at 2706.
290 Id. at 2696 & n.17 and 2704 & n.37.
299 Id. at 2703-04.
3 G° See id. at 2717 (White J., dissenting).
301 Id. at 2706-08 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
May 1983)
	
CASENOTES	 767
comparability of the President's functions to those of other officials previously
granted absolute immunity. 902 In so doing, the Court used the separation of
powers only to add greater authority and emphasis to the holding, not to justify
its conclusion. Close scrutiny of the Butz functional comparability test and the
public interests behind absolute immunity make it clear that this immunity
should have been granted — even absent the separation of powers doctrine —
on a simple functional comparison of the President's responsibilities with, for
example, a judge's duties."' The separation of powers doctrine, therefore,
does nothing to make this case inconsistent with previous immunity decisions,
but rather makes it the highest rung on the immunity ladder. With all of the
factors .required in the Butz functional comparability test present plus the
separation of powers doctrine, Nixon v. Fitzgerald is both harmonious with Butz
and the strongest possible absolute immunity protection accorded a public
servant. Thus, the absolute immunity granted the President is entirely consis-
tent with that granted other officials at common law, and is fortified by an ad-
ditional constitutional mandate.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF NIXON FOR FUTURE IMMUNITY CASES
The Supreme Court's decision in Nixon v. Fitzgerald will not lead to a large
increase in the number of government officials granted absolute immunity in
the future. First, to obtain any immunity, either qualified or absolute, an of-
ficial will have to show that he acted within the outer perimeter of his duties. At
that point, most officials will be granted qualified immunity only, which pro-
tects them if,' in the view of the court, they had reasonable grounds at the time
and in the circumstances for a good faith belief that they were acting legally
and within the scope of their duties. 304 Under Butz as clarified by Nixon, only a
3" It at 2702-04.
3" The use of the functional comparability test as the primary justification for absolute
immunity, rather than the separation of powers argument, is particularly appropriate in Nixon.
The Nixon Court states that its approach to the case will be expressly to avoid the constitutional
issues that would arise if Congress had explicitly created a damages action against the President.
Id. at 2701 n.27. Since the Court is therefore limiting its holding to granting the President ab-
solute immunity from civil suits in implied causes of action, id. , the Court's use of the common
law functional comparability test it has developed in prior immunity cases is all the justification it
needs. However, the situation would be different if Congress should, in the future, expressly
create a damage action against the President. lf, for example, Congress were to enact a statute
along the general lines of section 1983 but aimed at the President, providing that "no president,
under color of federal law, shall deprive any person of his constitutional rights," the Court would
have to decide the separation of powers argument as an independent argument, distinct from the
public policy arguments for absolute immunity. The President would argue that the legislative
branch does not have the power under the constitution to impinge on the executive in such a
fashion; if the courts tried to enforce such a statute against him, the President might argue that
the judicial branch does not have such power either. Such a statute would create a case in which
the separation of powers argument would by necessity be decisive. Such is not the case, however,
in Nixon, and the Court was therefore able to merge the separation of powers argument with the
functional comparability argument and use the separation of powers argument as additional
justification for granting the President absolute immunity.
904 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
768	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 24:737
few key officials will have absolute immunity based on the functional com-
parability of their duties to those other officials granted absolute immunity in
the public interest, like judges, prosecutors and the President."' The Court has
already served notice that it will grant this absolute immunity sparingly. In a
companion case to Nixon, Harlow v. Fitzgerald'" the Court considered whether
President Nixon's top aides would be granted absolute immunity for the very
same constitutional violations the President was alleged to have committed in
Nixon v. Fitzgerald.'" The Court held that presidential aides do not perform a
sufficiently sensitive function to make it in the public interest to grant them ab-
solute immunity. 3°° Rather, the Court found that, as in the case of a cabinet of-
ficial in Butz,'" the public policy interests were outweighed by the importance
of preserving the constitutional rights of the individual, and only qualified im-
munity would apply."°
When the holding in Harlow is considered together with the Court's deci-
sion in Nixon v. Fitzgerald it is apparent that their effect is to reaffirm the holding
in Butz that most government officials will have only qualified immunity. In-
deed it is difficult to envision the Court, having rejected absolute immunity for
cabinet officers in Butz, presidential aides -in Harlow and state governors in
Scheuer, granting such immunity to government officials other than the Presi-
dent, judges and prosecutors. Members of Congress need not be considered by-
the Court since they are expressly granted absolute immunity for their official
acts by the Constitution."' The Vice-President of the United States, however,
would have difficulty showing that the public interest demanded absolute im-
munity for his office under the stringent application of the functional com-
parability test in Butz and Harlow. Moreover, the duties of government officials
other than the President probably are not sufficiently sensitive to warrant ab-
solute immunity. In conclusion, Nixon v. Fitzgerald represents a narrow applica-
tion of the Butz functional comparability test to the unique office of the
Presidency resulting in the granting of absolute immunity to the President, but
not signaling a large increase in the number of officials protected by absolute
immunity in the future.
CONCLUSION
Nixon v. Fitzgerald was a case of first impression, wherein the United States
Supreme Court considered whether the President was absolutely-immune from
civil damage liability for constitutional violations. The Constitution is silent on
"5 See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2704 (1982); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.
478, 506 (1978).
'°° 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982).
"7 Id. at 2730.
3°° Id. at 2736.
3°9
 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 481 (1978).
31°
 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2736 (1982).
31 See U.S. CONST: art. I, 6.
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the precise issue. Prior to 1971, few people had sued the President for civil
damages. In 1971, when the Court created a civil damage remedy against
federal officials in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Agents, the possibility of suits
against the President loomed larger. Moreover, the Court in Butz v. Economou
held that most federal officials have only qualified immunity, but that where
public interest demanded it, certain officials would be given absolute immunity
from civil damages predicated on official acts:
In Nixon, the Court concluded that absolute immunity was a functionally
mandated incident of the President's unique constitutional status and the
separation of powers doctrine. The Court determined that absolute immunity
was supported by both constitutional history and public policy. The
President's duties, the Court reasoned, were broad in scope and had
widespread impact on the public, like those of judges and prosecutors — of-
ficials previously granted absolute immunity by the Court. In addition, the
Court emphasized that the President holds a unique position in the United
States' constitutional structure, a fact adding to the necessity of a finding of ab-
solute presidential immunity.
In concluding that the President has absolute immunity from civil damage
liability for deprivations of constitutional rights, the Nixon Court followed
precisely the analysis suggested in Butz to distinguish those officials whose func-
tions require absolute immunity from those who generally have qualified im-
munity. The Nixon Court looked first to the threshold question of whether any
immunity existed, and then considered the type of immunity appropriate for
the President. In light of this analysis, Nixon v. Fitzgerald is in harmony with
prior immunity decisions of the Supreme Court. The Court noted, however,
that the separation of powers doctrine provides further support for granting ab-
solute immunity. Presidential immunity therefore is the most strongly sup-
ported immunity possible in our constitutional structure.
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